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SOME COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Werner Lorenzt
Looking at the law of torts as it has been developed by courts
and scholars in the United States, a civil lawyer is not merely
impressed by the large number of decided cases, but is also
fascinated by the variety of solutions offered to many important
problems. This is particularly true in the area of products liability.
Even though its ramifications with respect to the law of contract are
obvious, over several decades it has become a distinct branch of the
.law of torts. Because "the assault upon the citadel of privity," of
which Cardozo spoke in 1931, has been successful, it seems ap-
propriate to deal with products liability. primarily from the
perspective of extra-contractual responsibility. The need for such
an approach is supported by the fact that defective products may
cause damage not merely to the ultimate buyer and persons who
belong to his family or household or who are guests in his home,2
but may also injure innocent bystanders to whom no lawyer's
ingenuity can extend a contractual relation with a previous seller of
the product. Although the products liability section of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts3 is no longer phrased in terms of "warranty,"
recovery under the new section is limited to ultimate users or
consumers. The draftsmen added that they did not want to express
an opinion as to whether the new rules of strict liability might also
be applied to persons other than users or consumers. 4 This some-
what hesitant attitude shows that the Restatement has not yet com-
pletely departed from the theory of warranty. Once it is realized
that sound legal policy requires protection of the public at large
against damage resulting from defective products, the remedies of
tort law should be available not merely to passengers in defective
automobiles but likewise to pedestrians hit by such vehicles. It
appears that the American case law has developed in this direc-
t Professor of Law, University of Munich, Germany. Dr. Jur. 1951, University of
Heidelberg.
1 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
2 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, alternative A (1972).
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
4 Id., Explanatory Notes § 402A, caveat (1) at 348. It should be noted, however, that
"user" is also meant to include persons "who are passively enjoying the benefit of a product."
See id., Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment I at 354.
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tion.5 This is to be welcomed, because bystanders normally have
little opportunity to search for defects.
Compared with this advanced state of the American extra-
contractual law of products liability, European law lags behind.
Courts and legislators in some countries, however, have become
increasingly aware of the social impact of tbis problem. Since it is
not the purpose of this paper to survey recent developments of this
branch of law in the major European legal systems, no attempt will
be made to review the various solutions sought by national courts,
legislators, and scholars with which an eminent American com-
paratist like Professor Schlesinger is doubtless well acquainted. In
my opinion, the steps which are now being taken to unify the law
of products liability on a European level deserve more attention
than solutions envisaged within the framework of any particular
national legal system. Progress is possible on several fronts. The
Hague Conference on Private International Law, for example, has
attempted to unify the conflicting rules applicable to products
liability cases containing a foreign element. As a result of this work,
the Twelfth Session of the Hague Conference (October 1972)
approved a Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liabil-
ity.6 The advantages to be gained from uniform conflict rules need
not be explained to an American lawyer whose daily bread consists
of solving the most difficult interstate conflict cases. However, it
goes without saying that unification of substantive law is superior to
mere unification of rules determining the applicable law.
Two European organizations are presently engaged in bring-
ing about the desired uniformity of the law of products liability: (1)
The Council of Europe (Strasbourg) has set up a Committee of
Experts, which held its first meeting in November 1972.' Since
5 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 663 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g.,
Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776
(N.D. Ind. 1969); Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970); Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Darryl v.
Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
6 See Conference de La Haye de droit international priv6, Actes et documents de la
Douzi~me session 2 au 21 octobre 1972, Tome III, Responsabilit6 du fait des produits, Acre
final 246-50 (1974); see also Lorenz, Der Haager Konventionsentwurf iber das auf die Produk-
tenhaftpflicht anwendbare Recht, 37 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLKNDISCHES UND INTER-
NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 317 (1973).
7 The present writer participated in these meetings as head of the delegation of the
Federal Republic of Germany. According to the Statute of the Council of Europe (signed in
London on May 5, 1949), it is the aim of the Council "to achieve a greater unity between its
Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are
their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." Article 1 of the
Statute from which this citation is taken further provides that "[t]his aim shall be pursued
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then the Committee of Experts has met several times a year, and
the work on a European Convention Relating to the Law of
Products Liability has now reached its final stage. The draft of the
Convention, together with an explanatory report, will soon be
submitted to the European Committee of Legal Cooperation
(CCJ) 8 for final consideration. If accepted, the draft will be opened
for signature and ratification by the Member States of the Council
of Europe. (2) Independent of the Council of Europe, the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC), as early as 1968, made its first
plans to examine the subject of products liability. However, due to
the negotiations with the United Kingdom in 1971, these plans had
to be postponed. The idea of harmonizing the law of products
liability among Member States of the European Community was
later given a fresh impulse by the final declaration of the Paris
Summit Meeting of the Heads of Government of the nine Member
States, held in December 1972. Item No. 6 of this Declaration
demands formulation of a better consumer protection program,
and it was tacitly understood that products liability should be one
of its major aspects.9 The differing legal positions in the various
member states of consumers who have suffered damage directly
affects the operation of the Common Market ° in three ways. It
means that consumer protection not only varies considerably as
between Member States, but also remains inadequate. In view of
through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and by
agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administra-
tive matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms." At present the Council of Europe has 18 Member States. For more details, see
A. H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 33 (2d ed. 1966). The full text of the Statute of
the Council of Europe is reprinted in Appendix I, at p. 272.
The Committee of Experts was established pursuant to a resolution adopted by the
Committee of Ministers acting on a proposal of the European Committee of Legal Coopera-
tion. The decision was taken by the Committee of Ministers at the I92nd meeting of the
Deputies; see CM/Del/Conc. (70) 192, item VI. Valuable preparatory work was done by
UNIDROIT-the Institute for the International Unification of Private Law in Rome-wbich
submitted a report stating the law governing the liability of producers-both in contract and
in tort-of the Council of Europe's Member States, the United States, Canada, and Japan;
see Document EXP/Resp. Prod. (71) 1, vols. I, II, & III. See also Secretary General of
UNIDROIT, Third Report on the results and prospects of cooperation between the Council of Europe
and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Eur. Consult. Ass.,
24th Sess., Doc. No. 3145, 3 Docs 3 (1972).
6 See note 7 supra.
9 Declaration of Paris Summit meeting, item #6. For the full text of the Declaration of
Heads of State or Government of the enlarged Community, see XX ANNUAIRE EuRoPi-N/
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 473 (1974).
10 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 100,
298 U.N.T.S. 5, 54; A. CAMPBELL, CoMMoN MARKET LAW, TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES § 1224
(1962).
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the different costs borne by industries in the various Member
States, competition is distorted and free movement of goods within
the Common Market is impeded. For these reasons, the Commis-
sion of the European Community bas decided to issue a directive
which takes into account the differences between the laws of the
Member States. This directive will establish rules to protect the
interests of consumers, remove distortions of competition within
the Community, and dismantle obstacles to the free movement of
goods.
Since actual work on the proposed directive began only a few
months ago, it is still too early to enter into a discussion of this
project." The directive to be developed in Brussels will certainly
benefit from the previous discussions of the subject at Strasbourg
because the Member States of the European Community were all
represented in the Committee of Experts of the Council of Europe.
But it is obvious that a directive is in many respects different from
a convention of the type prepared by the Council of Europe. In the
present context this needs no explanation. Nevertheless, the situa-
tion for those countries which are Member States of both organiza-
tions has been complicated by the fact that the same subject has
been approached almost simultaneously on different European
levels.
I
SCOPE OF CONSUMER RECOVERY
The European Draft Convention on Products Liability must be
viewed against the background of a case law development in the
majority of Member States extending the liability of producers.
New production techniques as well as marketing and sales methods
have increased the need to protect consumers. Thus, in the words
of the preamble, it is the aim of the Convention "to ensure better
protection of the public." The legitimate interests of producers,
however, are also to be taken into account. We shall discover the
extent to which this Convention has really succeeded in achieving a
11 There is a "first preliminary draft directive concerning the approximation of the laws
of Member States relating to product liability" dated August 1974; see Working Document
No. 2 to the attention of the working group "product liability," XI/334/74. This draft was
discussed at the first meeting of the group held in Brussels from Jan. 7 to Jan. 9, 1975. The
present writer, together with Professor Andr6 Tunc from the Universit6 de Paris 1, has been
invited by the Commission of the European Community to act as an expert of the
Commission.
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fair balance between the various interests involved in products
liability cases.
Before delving into the details of any substantive proposals,
the Strasbourg Committee of Experts made several important
decisions setting the scope of the Convention. The first question
considered was whether contractual as well as non-contractual
liability should be included. The Committee soon realized that any
attempt to unify the national rules governing contractual liability
would raise virtually insuperable problems. This was evidenced by
the history of the Hague Conventions of 1964 on the Unification of
Law governing the International Sale of Goods.' 2 These were the
outcome of decades of painstaking work by distinguished compara-
tive lawyers from several European countries. In this context, it
may perhaps suffice to remind the reader of Ernst Rabel, whose
famous comparative study on Das Recht des Warenkaufs provided
the indispensable preliminary research for this project.'3
Moreover, the classical remedies of sales law dealing with warran-
ties against defects of quality are mainly concerned with rescission
of the contract, reduction of the price, and recovery of commercial
loss. These remedies are not the hard core of products-liability
recovery as found in cases of personal injury or physical property
damage caused by defective products that the manufacturer has
put into the stream of commerce. It has already been pointed out
that with respect to these types of damage the "innocent bystander"
is just as worthy of protection as the ultimate buyer or consumer of
the product.'4 This militated in favor of a system of liability
without reference to the existence of a contract between the person
liable and the person suffering damage.' 5 The Convention there-
12 As a result of these Conventions there are now two uniform laws: (1) The Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods, and (2) the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The following States have ratified these
Conventions: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Israel, The Netherlands, San
Marino, and the United Kingdom.
13 See E. RABEL, DAS RECHT DES WARENKAUFS (1957).
14 See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
15 It should be noted that even the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability (see note 6 supra) excludes the whole sphere of contracts from the field of
application. Art. I par. 2 states that "[w]here the property in, or the right to use, the product
was transferred to the person suffering damage by the person claimed to be liable, the
Convention shall not apply to their liability inter se" This means that different laws may be
applied to the contract action and to the tort action if a legal system permits concurring
actions in contract and in tort. A proposal by the delegation of the Federal Republic of
Germany aimed at solving this difficulty was rejected; see Conference de La Haye de droit
international priv6, Actes et documents de la Douzibme session 2 au 21 octobre 1972, Tome
III, Responsabilit6 du fait des produits, Document de travail No. 22, at 151 (1974); Lorenz,
supra note 6, at 152-53.
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fore rejects any discriminatory treatment as between the consumer
who has purchased a product and other persons suffering damage
due to its defective condition.
Originally, it had been the intention of the Committee of
Experts to deal with a producer's liability not only for death or
personal injury, but also for damage caused to property. In view of
the slow progress made in other basic matters of the Convention,
however, this idea had to be abandoned. Moreover, doubts were
raised as to whether the same principles of liability should apply to
both types of damage, and it was feared that some states might not
consider ratification if property damage were included. A prelimi-
nary draft that attempted to deal with damage caused to property
revealed the inherent difficulties. Had they been adopted with the
exception that some delegations insisted upon, little would have
remained to these provisions. Thus, it was suggested to exclude
from the Convention: (1) damage caused to the product itself; (2)
damage caused to property because the product did not fulfill the
purpose for which it was destined; (3) damage caused to a finished
product by a component part; and (4) economic loss resulting from
damage referred to in (1), (2), and (3). Most of these exceptions are
based upon the idea that in these situations recovery is better left to
the law of contracts. There was also a strong tendency to leave to
the law of each signatory state such matters as the limitation on the
amount of compensation and the permissibility of clauses exculpa-
ting a producer's liability. For these reasons the present Draft
Convention is limited to compensation for death or personal in-
jury, and the CCJ will have to decide whether or not an additional
protocol on products liability with respect to property damage is to
be developed. 16
The Committee of Experts also had to decide whether the
fault-based theory of liability should be replaced by strict liability.
Among the countries represented in the Council of Europe, only
France had a system of producer's liability which, in its practical
16 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A also protects against "physical harm" in the
form of damage to the user's land or chattels. The doctrine of strict liability in tort, however,
does not permit the recovery of pure economic loss. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.); but see also the dissenting
opinion of Justice Peters in Seely. The contrary view was also maintained by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in the case of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965). But recovery of commercial loss was denied in State v. Campbell, 442 P.2d
215 (Ore. 1968) and Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965). For a discussion of this
problem see Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product
Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966) and Note, The Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69
COLUM. L REv. 1084, 1101 (1969).
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effect, is not based on fault. Both the fabricant and the vendeur
professionnel are held liable for damages under a theory of garantie
derived from Article 1645 of the Code Civile.' 7 A manufacturer or
seller who is engaged in the business of selling the product which
has caused the damage is thus deemed to have known the vice de la
chose.'8 Although this action sounds in contract, the procedural
device of appel en garantie enables the last buyer to get a judgment
against the manufacturer with whom he was not in a contractual
relationship. In a system like this the practical importance of the
classical delictual remedies under Arts. 1382, 1383 of the Code
Civile, which are based upon the notion of fault, is greatly re-
duced.' 9
In other countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany,
the tort action based upon a provision of the Civil Code 20 is still the
main remedy available to an injured consumer who has no direct
contractual link with the manufacturer. However, the German
Federal Supreme Court (BGH) achieved a major breakthrough in
the field of products liability by shifting the burden of proof. It was
held that
if somebody uses an industrial product in accordance with its
expected use and suffers damage with respect to one of the
rights specified in § 823 par. 1, because the goods had been
produced defectively, then it is for the manufacturer to elucidate
the events which caused the defect in the goods and to prove that
they did not involve any fault on his part.2'
The court was of the opinion that it was not entitled to introduce a
system of strict liability, that this was a decision reserved for the
legislature. Theoretically, therefore, the basis of products liability
in Germany is still fault on the part of the manufacturer. Neverthe-
less, this new system of reversed burden of proof comes very close
'7 Code Civile [C. Civ.] art. 1645 (73e ed. Petits Codes Daloz 1973-74).
18 For details see Mazeaud, La responsabilit civile du vendeur-fabricant, 53 REV.TRIM.DR.CIV.
611 (1955); see also Malinvaud, La responsabilit dvile du vendeur a raison des vices de 1a chose,
[1968] La Semaine Juridique [J.C.P.] 1. 2153. The leading French case is the famous decision
of the Cour de Cassation in the "affaire du 'pain maudit' de Pont-Saint-Esprit": Cass. Civ. 19
Jan. 1965, [1965] Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 389 = Gazette du Palais [Gaz. Pal.]
1965.1.359.
,1 C. Civ. arts. 1382-8 (73e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1973-74).
20 Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 823 par. 1 (Beck 1974).
21 See Judgment of Nov. 26, 1968, 51 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 91, 102. For a detailed comparative discussion of this case, see Lorenz,
Einige rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen zum gegenwartigen Stand der Produktenhaftpflicht im
deutschen Recht, 34 RABELsZ 14 (1970). The case is also discussed by Mankiewicz, Products
Liability-A Judicial Breakthrough in West Germany, 19 INr'L & ComP. L.Q. 99 (1970).
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to strict liability. It appears that a manufacturer will rarely be able
to convince a court that no negligence was involved when a
defective product was put into circulation. Indeed, since this lead-
ing decision there has arisen no known case in which the action was
dismissed on the ground that the manufacturer had exonerated
himself. It should be pointed out, however, that under this system
of products liability there are at least two types of cases in which
recovery must be denied: (1) There may be situations in which the
manufacturing process and the quality control are fully
mechanized. Thus, it may be difficult to find a human being who
could possibly have been negligent, because it was a machine
which had failed. (2) The manufacturer may still prove that the
damage was unforeseeable and unavoidable in the state of scientific
knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation, and
that the defect could not have been known when the damage
occurred ("development risk").22
Even with the reversal of the burden of proof, the Committee
of Experts decided that the notion of fault no longer constituted a
workable basis for products liability theory in an era in which
modern technology had created unacceptable risks for the con-
sumer. In the opinion of the majority, a system which merely
reversed the burden of proof would not represent an appreciable
improvement of the current situation in those countries where
fault was still the basis of liability. It was even feared that claimants
might still be embroiled in disputes concerning the internal opera-
tion of the manufacturer's firm. These fears appear to be exagger-
ated; they are certainly not borne out by the case law as it has been
developed in Germany under the new rule described above. Be
that as it may, there can be no doubt that this decision was also
influenced by the development of the American case law of prod-
ucts liability, which for some time has been based upon similar
considerations. The discussions at Strasbourg were permeated with
the idea that the European public was demanding a spectacular
change, and that this demand, as one delegate remarked during
the discussions, could only be satisfied by doing something "rev-
olutionary."
After this decision in favor of liability without fault had been
made, the question arose as to how "strict" or "absolute" this
liability should be. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, again a valuable
22 Whether the Thalidomide case (in Germany: Contergan) may be brought under this
category remains uncertain. In Germany, the case was settled out of court, that is, a fund of
DM 150 millions was established in order to compensate the victims.
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source of inspiration, speaks of products "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user. '23 "Defect" is thus defined in
terms of "danger," i.e., exposure to risk. The draftsmen of the
Restatement have explained this notion of "defect" in their com-
ment: if a product "is safe for normal handling and consumption"
it is not to be considered defective.24 But in view of the fact that it
is impossible to make all products entirely safe for all consumption
or use, they are regarded as defective only if the risk involved is
"unreasonable." This gives a court some discretion, and it is here
that a duty arises to warn against known risks. The criterion of
"reasonableness" therefore provides an important guideline for
dealing with unavoidably unsafe products, a phenomenon which is
looming large in the field of drugs.
For reasons which may not convince an American lawyer, the
notion of "danger" was rejected by the Committee of Experts. This
applies to the definition "dangerous product" as well as to other
formulas using the concept of "danger," e.g., "the specific danger-
ous qualities of a product." The majority held that in the context of
a product the word "dangerous"' was equivocal and unsatisfactory
because it would be difficult to decide what products were danger-
ous, some being dangerous by their very nature and others likely to
become so only if defectively made. Experience reveals that serious
damage is often caused by apparently harmless products that have
become dangerous due to some miscarriage of the manufacturing
process.25 Thus, "an automobile is not an inherently dangerous
vehicle," but, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 26 Cardozo was
certainly right in adding that this merely means "that danger is not
to be expected when the vehicle is well constructed. 27 The rejec-
tion by the Committee of Experts of the notion of "danger" was
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment h at 351
(1964).
25 In the area of products liability it is helpful to distinguish between the following
categories of cases: (1) products causing damage because of faulty design; (2) products which
are defective because something went wrong during the manufacturing process; (3) prod-
ucts which are not defective as such but whose use may be unsafe unless proper instructions
or warnings are given; and (4) products which are regarded as safe in terms of available
knowledge when put into circulation, but which turn out to be barmful on the basis of
subsequent scientific discovery. For details see Lorenz, Landerbericht und rechtsvergleichende
Betrachtung zur Haftung des Warenherstellers, in Die Haftung des Warenherstellers, 28 ARBElTEN
ZUR RECHTSVERGLE1CHUNG 5 (1966); see also Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE LJ. 887, 938
(1967), which supplements this classification by adding a further group of cases, unavoidably
unsafe products. However, it is argnable that these cases may be brought under category (3).
26 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
27 Id. at 394, 111 N.E. at 1054.
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perhaps prompted by a fear that subtle distinctions without a real
difference might be drawn by the courts. It goes without saying
that this would endanger the aim of harmonization of national
laws.
After long and repeated discussion at several meetings, the
term "defect" was made the heart of the Draft Convention's system
of liability. The Committee formulated a negative definition taking
as the basic elements "safety" and "legitimate expectancy." Hence,
a product has a "defect" when it does not provide the safety which
a person is entitled to expect, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances including the product's appearance. This definition
makes clear that the notion of "defect" also covers those cases
where the product as such is not defective, but where proper
directions as to its use or warnings (e.g., on the container) must be
given in order to prevent damage to the consumer or, user. This
definition of "defect" does not say anything about the time at which
the safety of a product must be determined. During the Committee
debates, a suggestion was made that the safe nature of the product
should be judged at the time the product was put into circulation
and not at the time when the damage occurred. Because it might
have implicitly resolved the crucial problem of "development risk,"
this proposal was rejected by the majority. The concern was that a
court might rule out a "defect" in cases where the kind of risk
involved was unforeseeable and unavoidable in the state of scien-
tific knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation.28
This notion of defect is the basis of the principal cause of
action established by the Draft Convention: "The producer shall
pay compensation for death or personal injuries caused by a defect
in his product." At least in the opinion of the majority of the
Committee of Experts, this means that one is entitled to protection
against "development risks" as measured by standards of safety
which, until the damage became apparent, were beyond human
contemplation. It is by the way of an expostfacto rationalization that
28 Some American courts have denied the liability of cigarette manufacturers in cases
where the claimants could prove that a certain brand of cigarettes they had smoked for
many years had caused lung cancer. In these cases, strict liability was denied on the ground
that there was no foreseeability of that kind of risk; see Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964). But
see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), wherein the action succeeded
under Florida law. For details as to the complicated history of Green, whicb was eventually
reversed by the drcuit court sitting en banc (409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969)), see W. PROSSER,
supra note 5, § 99, at 660 n.82. Different considerations will apply in cases where the
manufacturer, by way of advertising or sales literature, warrants that his products are not
harmful; see Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956); Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F2d 392 (3d Cir. 1961).
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a court may hold that the product has turned out to be defective.
The modern legal policy of consumer protection may well encour-
age the expansion of liability to include risks which become known
as a result of subsequent scientific discovery, but it is difficult to
reconcile this view with a notion of defect which is phrased in
terms of legitimate safety expectations. The utmost a consumer or
user of a product may legitimately expect is that the product
corresponds to the highest possible standard of the lex artis known
at the time it is marketed. Moreover, he may expect a manufac-
turer to constantly observe his products after having put them into
the stream of commerce. In other words, the manufacturer is
under a duty of product observation (Produktbeobachtungspflicht).
Creating higher expectations would be paramount to demanding
the impossible. A legislator who wants to go beyond these natural
limits should clearly say so. The mere omission of the time-element
in the definition of "defect" is too subtle a device to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that "development risks" are included. It
is submitted, therefore, that the Draft Convention uses a notion of
defect which does not adequately express the real intentions of its
draftsmen, and it is by no means certain that different national
courts will arrive at the same construction. Nor will it suffice to
mention this point in the explanatory report of the Convention,
because it is not the practice of courts in all countries to look into
such materials describing a Convention's history.29 If a proper
formulation for the principle of liability as envisaged by the Stras-
bourg Convention on Products Liability were sought, it should
simply read as follows: "The producer shall be liable for death or
personal injuries caused by his product." Liability would thus be
stated in absolute terms. Under the present text as interpreted by
the draftsmen, the only expectation that counts is that one will not be
injured by a product. This shows that the gist of the action is
causation. Under such a system the manufacturer can avoid liability
merely by proving one of the three classical exonerations which in
French law, for instance, are recognized as cause gtrangkre, particu-
larly in the area of Art. 1384 par. 1 of the Code Civile:force majeure,
faute de la victime and intervention d'un tiers.30
It is perhaps worth noting that the proposal to make an
29 It is interesting to note that there was agreement that the "time" element may be
relevant in certain situations which are covered by the definition of "defect." Thus, a person
who in 1974 bought a refrigerator manufactured 20 years earlier which, unlike the 1974
models, did not possess certain safety devices, could not expect the degree of safety offered
by a refrigerator manufactured in 1974.
30 See 2 H., L ErJ. MAZEAUD, RESPONSABILITE CIVILE, §§ 1429-1665, at 524-780 (6th ed.
1970).
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exception with respect to "development risks" met with the objec-
tion that it would make the Convention nugatory by reintroducing
into its system of strict liability the possibility for the producer to
prove the absence of fault on his part. Such fears were rooted in
the fact that the element of foreseeability would come into play.
Foreseeability is a negligence term which was deemed inappro-
priate for a Convention starting out with strict liability. This
argument, however, is not entirely convincing. Strict liability based
on the notion of "defect" is concerned with the allocation of risks
which are typical for the activities of a certain enterprise: the
entrepreneur is held liable for calculable risks which are reasonably
insurable.3 1 Within the area of such risks it is certainly impermissi-
ble to argue that the defect which caused the harm has arisen from
sources other than the negligence of the manufacturer (with the
exception of the above-mentioned cause gtrangkre). Thus, the as-
sembler of the final product could not escape liability by proving
that there was negligence on the part of the manufacturer of a
component and that it was impossible to discover this defect during
the process of assembling. Such risks are clearly foreseeable, and
under a system of strict liability the manufacturer of the final
product is not allowed to show that he used all possible care to
avoid the defect. True "development risks," on the other hand, are
clearly distinguishable. They concern products which in the pres-
ent state of human skill and scientific knowledge cannot be made
entirely safe. Attention has been drawn in this context to penicillin
and cortisone, two of the greatest medical discoveries in the history
of mankind. Because such drugs may exhibit dangerous side ef-
fects despite having undergone long experimental stages, the ques-
tion has been asked whether drug companies might have refrained
from producing and selling.32
It is arguable that an exoneration with respect to "develop-
ment risks" fails to meet the demands of society in our age. If this
type of risk is excluded from individual liability, how will a com-
munity help the victim in a situation which may be aggravated by
the fact that a product has caused a large series of similar dam-
ages? It is fairly obvious that no civilized community could today
ignore such a castastrophe and leave the victims without sufficient
compensation. Unfortunately, the Committee of Experts, assisted
in its deliberations by representatives of the European Insurance
31 For a general discussion of this problem, see A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGUGENCE WITHOUT
FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422 (1966).
3' See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 99, at 661.
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Committee, has not convincingly determined the extent to which
such risks are insurable.3 3 In Germany, the Contergan cases--
outside Germany known under the name of Thalidomide-have
shown the social impact of this problem. 34 For these reasons the
German Federal Government has recently submitted to the Bundes-
tag a bill remodelling the law on pharmaceutical products.3 5 Al-
though the present system of liability of the individual manufac-
turer remains unchanged, the bill introduces absolute liability for
the entire pharmaceutical industry. For this purpose a Pharmaceu-
tical Products Indemnity Fund (Arzneimittelentschiidigungsfonds) will
be established.
The aim of the Pharmaceutical Products Indemnity Fund is to
alleviate hardship in three types of cases where the victim of a
pharmaceutical product presently receives little or no compensa-
tion: (1) the manufacturer is able to exonerate himself and thus is
not liable under the present system; (2) the manufacturer, al-
though liable, is unable to pay and is not sufficiently covered by
insurance; and (3) the manufacturer's funds, required by law to
cover personal injuries resulting from clinical testing, are nonexis-
tent or inadequate. The Indemnity Fund, therefore, exercises a
strictly subsidiary function. Its role is also subsidiary with respect to
payments made by an insurer, by Social Security, or by the
employer.3 6 The amount of compensation is limited by a dual
ceiling. In the event of death or personal injury to one person the
maximum amount is DM 0.5 million capital (or DM 30.000 an-
nuity). In the case of death or personal injury to several persons
the total amount to be paid by the Fund is DM 200 millions capital
33 At the beginning of its work the Committee of Experts was told that DM 50 millions
was probably the maximum amount for which coverage was obtainable on the reinsurance
market. As the work progressed, this figure was raised to DM 100 millions "and possibly
more."
'4 See note 22 supra.
" See Regierungsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts, July
17, 1974, issued by the Bundesministerium ffir Jugend, Familie, und Gesundheit.
" The Indemnity Fund is a nonprofit public institution which can be sued for
compensation only under certain conditions: (1) the use of a pharmaceutical product must
have caused a person's death or injured his body or health more than insignificantly
(excluding any compensation for petty damages, damage to property, or economic loss); (2)
the product must have been put into circulation in Germany; (3) the product, if properly
used according to instructions, at the time of release must have shown harmful effects which
exceed a level of tolerance considered acceptable by medical science, or the damage caused
must have been due to instructions falling short of the actual knowledge of medical science.
Contributions to the Fund are calculated according to the annual turnover multiplied by
different risk factors relating to the substances contained in an individual production
program. Their total, however, must not exceed 0.5% of the annual turnover achieved on
the German market.
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(or DM 12 millions annuity). If the total amount of damages
suffered by several persons exceeds this maximum limit of com-
pensation, the damages to be awarded to a single person will be
reduced at a ratio corresponding to the proportion between the
total amount of damages suffered and the maximum limit of
damages to be awarded.
The decision of the Committee of Experts in favor of strict
liability even in cases of "development risks" can be fully ap-
preciated only if one considers the manner in wbich the Conven-
tion allocates the burden of proof with respect to causation of
damage. It was initially decided that the producer should be liable
unless he could prove that the defect which caused the damage did
not exist at the time he put the product into circulation or that this
defect came into being at a later date. After further discussion,
however, this rigid formulation was modified to require only "that,
having regard to the circumstances, it is probable" that the defect
did not exist when the product was marketed or that the defect
arose afterwards. The substance of this provision is not really
affected by the cbange, because in this context "proving" means to
convince a court that a given event has a certain cause, e.g., that the
defect arose afterwards as a result of a repair not carried out in a
workmanlike manner. The same applies to the purely negative
proof that the defect did not exist when the product was put into
circulation. It goes without saying that such proof will often result
in what is usually called a "weighing of probabilities," particularly if
circumstantial evidence is presented. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the Draft Convention shifts the burden of proof with respect
to causation.
The Convention's system of strict liability appears to extend
beyond the present state of the law of products liability as it exists
in the majority of American jurisdictions. A recent decision of the
New York Court of Appeals, Codling v. Paglia,37 may serve as an
example for the proposition. It concerned a situation which is not
uncommon in road accidents. On a clear, dry day a car, which had
been bought only a few months earlier, suddenly drifted over the
double solid line into the opposite lane of traffic and collided head
on with an oncoming vehicle. The speed at the time of the accident
was forty-five to fifty miles per hour. In the present context, only
the evidentiary aspect of the action brought against the car man-
ufacturer is of interest. The uncontradicted proof was that the
automobile "went to the left," that the driver "tried to steer to the
37 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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right," but that he "couldn't steer right" for the car "wouldn't
budge, she wouldn't give." Counsel for the manufacturer argued
that no specific defect in the power steering was proven. Moreover,
he claimed that even if a defect at the time of the accident was
assumed, there was no proof that the defect existed when the
automobile left the manufacturer's plant. The Court of Appeals
approved the following instructions given to the jury by the trial
court:
While the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the product
was defective and that the defect existed while the product was in
the manufacturer's possession, plaintiff is not required to prove
the specific defect, especially where the product is complicated in
nature.... Though the happening of the accident is not proof of
a defective condition, a defect may be inferred from proof that
the product did not perform as intended by the manufacturer.3 8
As a matter of principle, therefore, the injured plaintiff must
prove that the product was defective at the time it left the hands of
the defendant manufacturer.3 9 Although this proof is obviously
not absolute or strict, in difficult situations it will be sufficient for a
plaintiff to show by a preponderance of probability that the defect
which caused the accident existed before its occurrence. In Ger-
man law prima facie evidence may help a plaintiff.40 In this context
he may be required to disprove the possibility that the defect was
caused by faulty repair work. This burden gains importance as
time passes from the moment the defective product was put into
circulation.
The Strasbourg Draft Convention obviously follows a different
approach to the problem of burden of proof. In a case of the type
decided by the New York Court of Appeals, the plaintiff need only
show that he was injured by this particular product and that the
accident occurred because the steering system was defective. In
order to escape liability, the manufacturer must prove either that
this specific defect did not exist when the car left his control or that
it arose afterwards (e.g., as a result of improper handling on the
part of someone else). As a matter of justice, the burden of proof
should be distributed according to the spheres of risk involved.
38 Id. at 337, 298 N.E.2d at 625, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
39 This is also the view expressed in the REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory
Notes § 402A, comment g at 351 (1964); see also Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485
F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973). For a general discussion of the proof required of a plaintiff seeking
recovery for injuries from a defective product, see W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 671-76.
40 For details see Lorenz, Beweisprobleme bei der Produzentenhaftung, 170 ARCHIV FUR DIE
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXis 367 (1970).
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This means that the plaintiff should account for his own sphere: he
must disprove possible causes of injury on his part.41 In so doing,
circumstantial evidence and the rules of prima fade evidence as
developed in the various legal systems will help in difficult situa-
tions. It will usually be sufficient to show a preponderance of
probabilities. What is needed, therefore, is a flexible system which
allows a court to weigh the different probabilities in order to
discover the greater probability. The Draft Convention, by choos-
ing the wrong starting point, does not permit a court to arrive at a
balanced appreciation of evidence. Moreover, the danger of fal-
sified claims is obvious.
As a result of this distribution of the burden of proof with
respect to causation, the system of liability established by the Draft
Convention is stricter than the law of products liability which
prevails in the most progressive American jurisdictions. Both the
inclusion in the Convention of "development risks" and the shift-
ing of the burden of proof have so fundamentally changed the
basis of liability that now it may fairly be called "absolute." It
remains to be seen whether the more industrialized among the
member states of the Council of Europe are prepared to go this
far.42 For some countries the decision may very well be influenced
by the position of the final text of the Convention with respect to
limits upon recovery. This does not necessarily mean that the states
ratifying the Convention should be completely free to set the
maximum amount of compensation. If granted such discretion, a
state might in an extreme case fix the amount so low as to reduce
the weight of the Convention to nil. This danger could be avoided,
however, by a solution of the type prevailing in certain conventions
on international transport.43 Contracting states could be permitted
41 See also the many actions against Coca-Cola Bottling Companies in which a plaintiff
claimed to have been injured by some foreign substance contained in the bottle. It is
interesting to note that courts may require a plaintiff to show that there was "no reasonable
opportunity for tampering with the bottle or its contents, in the interim between the physical
control of the bottler or manufacturer, and that of the consumer." Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 415, 158 S.W.2d 721, 725 (1942).
42 During the negotiations at Strasbourg, the present writer got the impression that
some delegates had no precise instructions from their governments on certain important
points. Thus, the votes which were taken (some of which were rather narrowly decided) do
not necessarily permit conclusions as to the position which some countries will adopt at the
time for signature and ratification.
43 See, e.g., Art. 6 of the Additional Convention to the International Convention
concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Rail (CIV) of 25th February 1961
Relating to the Liability of the Railway for Death of, and Personal Injury to, Passengers
(Berne 26 Feb. 1966) (English translation in 2 K. ZWEIGERT & J. KROPHOLLER, SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW 339, 340 (1972)).
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to limit the amount of compensation on the condition that it was
not less than a certain fixed sum. In this context it is necessary to
distinguish between the death or personal injury to one person and
the death or personal injury to several persons by a product of the
same type. While it is relatively easy to agree on a high amount in
the former instance, such agreement is not easily reached with
respect to an overall limit which has practical significance for
multiple claims arising, for instance, in the field of drugs.
III
PLACEMENT OF LIABILITY
Since it is not the purpose of this paper to deal exhaustively
with the problems raised by the Strasbourg Draft Convention, only
a few more points will be mentioned. They serve to indicate the
difficulties presented by this attempt at international unification of
substantive law on a European level.
The area of products liability is not easily defined because its
outer limits are somewhat blurred. This is confirmed by the incon-
sistent terminology used in this field. In Germany, for example, the
expressions Produzentenhaftung (producers' liability) and Produk-
tenhaftpflicht (products liability) are used as if they were inter-
changeable terms. The same is true in France where the subject is
called either La responsabilit du vendeur-frabricant or La responsabilit
dufait des produits. It is well known that the modern law of products
liability developed from duties that were placed upon sellers of
food and drink.44 This potential liability was quickly extended to
those who produced or sold any sort of chattel capable of doing
harm.45 Strict products liability has now been extended even to a
"mass-builder" of houses. In the New Jersey decision of Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc.,4 6 the child of the buyer had been injured by a
44 See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
45 See, e.g., McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (extension of strict
liability in case concerning animal food); see also Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958), wherein the court found a warranty,
without privity and without negligence, running from the manufacturer of cinder building
blocks to the owner of cottages, which, as a result of a defect in the materials supplied, had
started to crack.
46 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Kessler,
Caveat Emptor und der Schutz des Hauskdufers, in 2 lus PRIVATUM GENTIUM-FESTSCHRIFT FOR
MAX RHEINSTEIN 761, 771 (1969). Since then other jurisdictions have followed; see, e.g.,
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); State Stove
Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
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defective water heating apparatus. Because as used in the Draft
Convention the expression "product" includes movables which
have been "incorporated into immovables," the supplier of the
chattel in Levitt would certainly be held strictly liable. However, in
view of the fact that a number of countries retain a liability system
specific to immovables, the builder would not be covered by the
Convention. The Draft Convention, therefore, maintains a distinc-
don between the "manufacturer" of an immovable in its entirety
and the producer of a component part. In the opinion of some
experts this restriction on the scope of the Convention did not go
far enough. The suggestion was made to include only producers of
such movables which "retain their functional autonomy." This
would probably have meant that a boiler or an elevator would be
within the scope of the Convention, whereas a steel girder would
not. Courts in different countries, however, could hardly arrive at
a uniform construction for such a vague proposal. Distinctions
from the law of property47 might then have determined who is
responsible under the new regime of products liability. The liability
of suppliers of chattels should not depend upon niceties of the
law of property; the decision to reject such a proposal enhanced the
overall clarity.
Another area of dispute in the Draft Convention arose with
respect to natural products. To the extent that such goods have
been processed they are indistinguishable from other industrial
products, and their producers should be held equally liable under
the Convention. It was doubtful, however, whether fishermen and
growers of agricultural products should be held accountable to the
same standards. For some countries this matter was particularly
important. Even under the recent Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Products Liability,48 any contracting state may re-
serve the right not to apply the Convention to "raw agricultural
products. '49 That the Hague Convention found this problem too
controversial to handle illustrates how thorny a situation it created
for unification of substantive law. The majority view, which fa-
vored the inclusion of natural products in the Strasbourg draft,
nonetheless deserves support. It has become nearly impossible to
draw a clear distinction between agricultural and industrial goods,
especially since, under modern conditions, most agricultural prod-
47 See, e.g., BGB §§ 93, 946 (Beck 1974).
48 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
49 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, art. 16, 1, No. 2, in
Conftrence de La Haye, supra note 6, at 249.
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ucts are treated with one or more processes. These are often
applied by the farmer himself, as for example with the spraying of
insecticides and other chemicals. The case of a fisherman who
unknowingly took his catch from mercury-polluted waters presents
a somewhat different situation. One hesitates to classify him as a
"producer"; he supplies a simple product with no adulterations. In
contrast to the economic factors militating against "producer's"
liability in this case, it seems more reasonable to hold responsible
the processor of such natural products. He can exercise the neces-
sary quality control and is in a better position to insure against the
risks involved.
My final point is closely linked with another fundamental
matter which required a decision at Strasbourg. A Convention
which merely aims at unification of non-contractual conflict rules
should, of course, have as broad a scope as possible. It should
therefore address the liability of all persons in the commercial
chain of preparation or distribution of a product. Indeed, the
application of different conflict rules to manufacturers and other
suppliers would unduly complicate the choice-of-law process.5" For
substantive law, however, different considerations are necessary. In
this context, it must be borne in mind that the Draft Convention
does not interfere with contractual liability under the applicable
national law. Liability is established irrespective of contractual
relations which may or may not exist between the victim and the
person claimed to be liable.51
Compared with the present state of products liability in impor-
tant American jurisdictions, the Draft Convention's approach to
this problem is somewhat narrow. While the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in section 402A imposes strict liability on any seller who "is
engaged in the business of selling such a product," the Draft
Convention does not go as far. It clearly establishes the liability of
the manufacturer of a component part of an assembled product.52
However, the mere supplier of a product will be subject to strict
50 See id. art. 3, at 247. Article 3 even applies to repairers and warehousemen.
"i See text accompanying note 1 supra.
52 The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not express an opinion on this point (RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, caveat (3) at 348 (1964)); it appears that
this must have been the result of two cases in which such liability was denied: Montgomery v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). This writer does
not wish to express an opinion as to whether these decisions still represent the state of the
American law of products liability with respect to manufacturers of component parts. But see
W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 664, who states that strict liability also applies to the maker of a
component part.
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liability under the Draft Convention only on certain conditions. If
the product does not indicate the identity of the manufacturer,
each supplier may be held liable unless within a reasonable time
after a claimant's request the supplier discloses the identity of the
producer or of the person who supplied him with the product. As
a rule, therefore, wholesalers and retailers are not held strictly
liable. However, the Committee of Experts was well aware that
some sellers are currently causing their names or trademarks to
appear on products which others have manufactured for them.
Frequently the manufacturer of such a product is a small firm
which may not be financially responsible. While there is little doubt
that a seller "who puts out as his own product a chattel manufac-
tured by another"5 3 should be subject to the same liability as
though he were a manufacturer, difficult questions of delimitation
arise with respect to such intermediate persons who merely put
their name or some other distinguishing feature on the product.
Some European countries require sellers of certain products to do
so by law. Sometimes it is merely done for advertising purposes,
such as in the case of a car dealer who affixes his firm's tag to the
cars he sells. Assuming it to be good policy not to hold every dealer
responsible by the standards which apply to manufacturers, one is
certainly not justified in treating wholesalers or retailers like man-
ufacturers merely because their names appear somewhere on the
product. The true distinction as to whether or not these inter-
mediate persons may be analogized to producers would seem to be
the criterion of "holding out" as a manufacturer, that is, a seller
presents an item as his own product.
In spite of this principle against the inclusion of mere dealers,
the Draft Convention made another exception intended to im-
prove consumer protection. It gave special attention to situations
where damage is caused by products imported from other coun-
tries. Even if the manufacturer were known, it would be burden-
some for the victim to institute proceedings in a foreign country.
For this reason the importer of a product is subject to the same
liability which applies to the producer. The extent to which such a
rule will really help a plaintiff remains to be seen, for it is well
known that some firms in the import business are very small
companies with little capital.
Leaving aside these exceptions, the decision of the Draft
Convention not to impose strict liability upon dealers may be
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965), which deals with the same fact
situation.
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justified on at least two grounds. First, the notion of enterprise
liability, which is thought to be the true basis of this new type of
strict responsibility for damage caused by a defective product, does
not fit the situation of a dealer who is a mere conduit in the chain
of commerce. In view of the complicated nature of many products,
the possibility of intermediate inspection by the dealer is greatly
reduced, and even where possible, such inspection would very
often have to be executed in a way preventing the product's resale.
It follows that strict liability of the mere dealer will have no
appreciable "educational effect." The manufacturer, on the other
hand, is in an entirely different position. One might argue that an
airplane assembler does not possess any special knowledge when he
installs complicated electronic equipment purchased from a man-
ufacturer of such component parts. This oversimplifies the mat-
ter, however, because such assemblers have ample opportunity to
test their products before putting them into circulation.5 4 It is here
that strict liability can serve as an incentive to raise the standards of
quality control. Insurance is another important consideration
that militates in favor of such "channelling of liability." Many
dealers offer the public a large variety of products. Moreover,
there are sometimes rapid changes in the kind of goods they sell.
This means that the risks to be insured against are extremely
difficult to calculate, and there is always the danger that insurance
coverage will not be sufficient. But even if the insurance taken out
is commensurate with the risks involved, the question remains
whether it is reasonable to add the premiums paid by dealers to the
cost of the products.
A civil lawyer looking at the American law of products liability
is inclined to raise a final critical question. Should a system encour-
age litigation which starts with the weakest link in the chain of
successive sales and which, only through the device of third party
procedure, brings in the wholesaler, the assembler, and the man-
ufacturer of the defective component part which caused the dam-
age? This sort of circuitous litigation may well have an historical
explanation. It must be remembered that this new type of strict
products liability has developed from the seller's warranty against
defects of quality. During the last century, warranty actions were
regarded as contractual remedies. As such, they have been incor-
porated into the English Sale of Goods Act and in other similar
codifications of the common law system. Because under this prem-
" Cf Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
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ise privity of contract must be respected, it makes sense to roll
back the chain of successive sales. However, strict products liability,
even though it may sometimes be expressed in terms of "warran-
ty," is a very different kind of warranty from those usually found
in the context of a sale of goods.55 Once this is recognized, there is
no compelling reason to follow a procedure developed in the area
of contracts.
" See RESTATEMENT (SFCOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment m at 355
(1964).
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